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SYSTEM OF SHIPPING THEORY (3) 
-THE METHODS OF SHIPPING POLICY-
By Sempey Sawa 
Professor of Transportation 
While the shipping policy in its traditional sense dates from the modern 
times, it should be pointed out that it has witnessed a remarkable progress 
after the modern ages. Although it is generally considered that as various 
countries of the world are naturally equipped with their own respective ship-
ping policies in various concrete forms, such had naturally to follow their 
respective courses of development, it was nonetheless a fact that, consequent 
upon the phenomenal transition from the form of "private carrier" to the 
form of "common carrier," a world shipping market as an entity had 
come into existence, as a result of which the shipping policy of each 
country had inevitably undergone a certain extent of metamorphosis. In 
other words, in the days of private carrier, when goods needed by one 
country had to be transported aboard its own shipping, the shipping policy 
of that particular country had naturally to lay emphasis on the protection 
and subsidization of its own shipping, and thus its main concern centered 
on the domestic aspect of the country. As, however, the form of common 
carrier gradually replaced that of private carrier and then unrestricted 
utilization of shipping of other countries was made feasible, the shipping 
policy had unavoidably to think of its own shipping in its relation to 
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foreign shipping and give the necessary protection and subsidization to its 
own shipping. While protection and subsidization of own shipping still re-
mained to occupy the pivotal point of policy, its relation to world shipping 
at large had come into consideration more than its domestic angle. 
In strictly economic terms, it would seem unnecessary and superfluous 
to think of the development and subsidization of own shipping when foreign 
shippings of cheaper service are amply available. In such a case, it would 
even be said that a shipping policy is totally unnecessary. A shipping poli-
cy, it should be noted, will not always be determined by economic reasons. 
Non-economic reasons would often determine it. Even in the modern ages, 
it was not entirely out of question to utilize foreign shipping; much more 
so in the present times, when there is an unbounded scope of utilizing 
foreign shipping, which often offers cheaper and much better services. In 
spite of this, the fact stands that most countries still persist in adopting a 
more or less positive shipping policy of their own. This circumstance will 
not easily be explained away unless we presume that there are certain non-
economic reasons working behind all this. Notwithstanding this, the gradual 
generalization of the form of common carrier could not but exert a certain 
fundamental modification in the modern shipping policy of various countries. 
With reference to the domestic and foreign tendencies in the shipping 
policy in general, classification of the shipping policy as a "method " (direct 
method and indirect method) could be considered as wei\. 
Now, according to Heckhoff,ll protection and subsidization of shipping 
by means of judicial measures (Schiffahrtsschutz) is classified as the direct 
method, while subsidization through granting of subsidiary money (Schif-
fahrtssubvention) the indirect method. This is quite contrary to the usual 
method of classification adopted in the theories on shipping policy. In the 
usual classification, monetary and economic subsidization to domestic ship-
ping interests, including those connected with shipbuilding, is considered to 
be the shipping protection and assistance policy, and, therefore, the indirect 
method, defined by Heckhoff, is usually referred to as the direct method, 
while,. on the contrary, such policy as prompted merely by judicial measures 
is termed the indirect method. However, when the shipping policy is inter-
preted in its traditional sense with a predominance of its foreign tendency, 
monetary subsidization to domestic shippping interests would rather be in-
terpreted as the indirect method, and the judicial steps based upon the ex-
clusion of and discrimination against foreign vessels the direct method. He-
ckhoff did not explicitly expound the reasons and theoretical grounds for 
his method of classification. The classification of the present writer (Sawa) 
1) Heckhoff, H.: Die Schiffahrt in der AussenwirtschafLspolitik, K6ln 1938. S8. 25ff. 
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IS, according to the above mentioned reasons, as follows. 
. (Direct method ........ · Granting ?f ~p:cial privileges by 
Methods of ShlP- means of JudICIal measures 
ping Policy I Indirect method ...... Subsidization by means of gran-
\ ting of subsidiary money 
I. Definition of the Conception of National Vessels 
First thing to be definitely determined in connection with the adoption 
of a policy for the protection of national shipping would be how to classify 
the national ships from foreign vessels. National shipping constitutes the 
very object of such policy. It is, therefore, a great important thing to de-
termine a proper definition of the conception of national ships. The ship 
registry system was brought into being in an effort to answer this question. 
Let us first review this particular question from a historical point of 
view. At first every country tended to classify any vessel owned by its own 
nationals as a national ship. Among various means of transportation, how-
ever, shipping, unlike, for example, railways, is never confined to certain do-
mestic areas alone but has a more or less extended international areas of 
activity, and chartering and purchases of ships naturally take place frequ-
ently on an international scale. Thus, it is clear that the definition of 
national vessels merely on the ground of the respective nationality of their 
owners would be deemed inadequate in achieving the ultimate aim in view 
of a shipping policy. Suppose a certain country, for the purpose of main-
taining and strengthening its own shipping, decides to confer some pre-
ferential rights only to such vessels as are owned by its nationals, it would 
easily be presumed that some foreign vessels, in order to share in those 
special treatments, would take steps to nominally shift their nationality 
to that of this particular country in question. Furthermore, in order to see 
national shipping maintained and strengthened continuously in the true sense 
of the term, it would be necessary that not only a certain number of ships 
is owned but als~ at the same time, certain levels of shipbuilding industry 
as well as an adequate number of able sailors are available. Thus, it is 
obvious that, in order to meet these purposes, it is of essential necessity 
that, besides mere "ownership", "construction" on home land, "operation" 
by own nationals will have to be counted among the indispensable con-
ditions in any definition of national ships. 
The first law which was enacted in history for the purpose of defining 
that national ships should not only be owned by the nationals but also be 
operated by nationals, was probably the Shipping Act (1st Henry VII. ch. 
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8.) promulgated by Henry VII in 1485, the first year of his accession to the 
throne. This Act stipulated that Wine of Guienne and Gascony should be 
imported only in English ships, of which the greater part of the crew must 
be English. Considering the fact that Henry VII was the first king in the 
line of the Tudors, and that it was the Tudor dynasty that laid the ground-
work for the modern English shipping policy, the implications of this parti-
cular Act cannot afford to be overlooked. The Act (4th Henry VII. ch, 
10.) which was enacted three years later concerning the import of Tou-
louse Woad, further, stipulated that the captain should also be an English-
man. This stipulation was kept intact in the law of the Naval Encourage-
ment of 1540 (32nd Henry VIII. ch. 14.), in the law (5th Elrzabeth ch. 5.) 
enacted by Queen Elizabeth in 1562, the famous Cromwell Navigation Act 
of 1651 and so on. 
However, with the passing of the years into the Modern Ages, it was 
discovered that stipulation regarding the ownership and operation alone was 
quite inadequate for defining national ships, and, thus, the First Navigation 
Act (12th Charles II. ch. 18.) promulgated by King Charles II in 1660 
went so far as to stipulate that in order to be recognised as an English 
vessel, it should not only be owned and operated by English nationals but 
also that such ship should be constructed in England. This Act, further, 
stipulated, with regard to operation, that the captain and one-fourth of the 
sailors at least should be of English nationality. 
It should be noted, in this connection, that it was prior to the general-
ization of the form of common carrier that England was under such a strict 
form of ship registry system. Following the abolition of the Navigation Acts 
successively in 1849 and 1854, which allowed England to rapidly develop into 
a shipping country of the third type as classified by the present writer, the 
principle of ownership alone has up till today been left intact; the other 
principles of operation and construction have been given up. The same 
applies also with the shipping laws in force in Norway, Germany') and 
Japan'). France3) adopts both the principles of ownership and operation, 
while the United States of America sticks to the concurrent adoption of the 
three principles of ownership, operation and construction<l. The policy in 
which foreign-built ships are freely allowed to assume a certain nationality 
IS understood under the name of the free ship policy, and among the na-
1) The Ship Registry Act of June 22. 1899. 
2) The Ship Law of March. 8. 1899. 
3) It is the rule of the traditional shipping policy of France to subsidize almost all the vessels 
owned by her own nationals, without regarding to the domestic or foreign construction. 
4) The Merchant Marine Act of 1936. § 101.; The construction principle was already adopted 
in the first Ship Registry Act (1789) of U. S. A. 
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tions which adopt this policy since the 1st World War are mentioned England, 
Germany, Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Gre-
ece and Japan1). 
These various forms of the ship registry system adopted are sufficient 
to indicate the respective characteristics of these shipping nations. While it 
is assumed that such countries as have the overseas carrying routes as their 
principal spheres of activity, by sheer need of clarifying their relations to 
foreign ships, might endeavour to strictly determine and define the concep-
tions of national vessels, the fact that prevails is rather contrary to such 
assumption; in those countries where shippings have attained a certain high 
standard of development, an overduly strict application of the provisions for 
nationality of the ships might lead to the result of reducing tlle shipping 
bottoms normally required for the operation of their own shipping activity. 
It would thus be considered a matter of indispensable necessity that a way 
be left open for the importation or chartering of foreign vessels. This me-
ans that abolition of both the construction principle which hampers the 
importation of foreign ships and the operation principle which is liable to 
stand in the way of chartering of foreign ships, becomes a matter of urgent 
necessity. On the contrary, those countries where coastal shipping constitutes 
the main spheres of activity, in the face of the desire that these domestic 
shipping routes, at least, be left immune from the penetration of foreign 
ships, will have to impose a more strict conditions on the definition of na-
tional vessels. 
From a purely economic point of view, such strict ship registry system, 
together with the other shipping protection policies, would be harmful even 
in the shipping countries of the first type, as well. It stands to record that 
in the United States of America, following the termination of the Civil 
War, two parties, one standing for the shipping protection policy and the 
other for free ship policy, engaged in a bitter controversy over the issue 
of whether such ship registry system should be continued or not. This par-
ticular system has been retained up till today, and the result has been that 
one particular group of shipping and shipbuilding interests have been bene-
fitting from it. 
As has been mentioned partly in the preceding lines, the installation of 
the ship registry system and the definition of ship nationality are mainly for 
the purposes of the monopolization of coastal trades, the exemption or re-
duction of customs duties and the acquisition of various subsidies, which 
would be granted to national ships as special privileges. Such methods of 
policy are usually adopted especially when the carrying form of the first 
I) Jones, G. M.; Government Aid to Merchant Shipping, WaShington 1925. pp. 10-1\, 
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type is in force. Therefore, it should be said that, at present when a certain 
degree of development of the form of common carrier by foreign ships has 
already been attained, imposition of strict conditions on ship registry acts is 
obsolete and out of date. This, of course, can be said, from a purely eco-
nomic point of view alone. A different aspect will. loom into view, when 
national defence and other noneconomic factors are taken into consideration. 
II. Granting of Special Rights by Judicial Means 
(Protection of Shipping) 
A resort to judicial means would be inevitable, if an attempt is made 
to protect directly national shipping against foreign ones. Among the various 
legislative measures liable to be adopted for this purpose, the most extreme 
and severe would be the monopolization of shipping routes, while the more 
lenient would be discriminatory measures. The monopolization of a ship-
ping route applies when a certain country reserves the services exclusively 
for its own national shipping on the trades routes under its political control, 
while discrimination would take place when a certain country, while allo-
wing services by foreign ships, would treat them with certain disadvantages 
in comparison with its own national ships on the trade routes under its 
political control. To show these relations in a classified table'): 
/ a) Monopoly of general routes 
Special Rio-hts 1(1) Monopoly of b) Monopoly of colonial routes 
b J d o 0 I" \ trade routes ) M I f I d y u ICla c onopo y 0 coasta tra e routes 
Means 
(D O a) Discrimination in ships Irect () 0 0 0 0 Method) 2 DISCrImmatIon b) Discrimination in cargoes 
c) Other discriminations 
(1) Monopoly of Shipping Routes 
a) General Monopoly of Shipping Routes 
Among various forms of monopoly of shipping routes is mentioned one 
which is described as the general monopoly of shipping routes, which, with-
out specifying any special routes to be affected, would reserve all spheres 
of marine transportation for national ships to the total exclusion of foreign 
vessels. However, it should be noted that such general monopoly of shipping 
routes is rather too vagu~ in its contents and should be considered to be 
attended with little possibility of actual realization, and, therefore, as a 
matter of fact, it follows that in some form or another there occurs a 
1) Heckhoff, H.: Die Schiffahrt in der Aussenwirtschaftspolitik, Koln 1938. 
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specification of particular routes together with cargoes carried. However, it 
must be pointed out that even this form of monopoly differs from the other 
forms of monopoly (the monopoly of colonial routes and of coastal routes), 
that its effect is more or less general compared with the other forms and 
that the lines affected are not necessarily under the political influence of the 
particular countries taking such measures. As instances of this form should 
be mentioned the case of Hansa, that the cities bound by the Hanseatic 
League were stipulated a compulsory loading of cargoes in the Hanseatic 
ships, the English law of 1381, (5th Richard II. statute I, ch. 3.) which 
stipulated that no English subject should be allowed to export from, or im-
port into England, any merchandise save in English ships and another law 
of 1390 (14th Richard II. ch. 6.) which ordered all English merchants 
should freight in the ships of the Realm, and not strange ships. 
In England in the early part of the modern ages, in her impatience to 
expel the influences of foreigners, such forms of exclusionist policy were 
often resorted to. In the enforcement of such measures, however, it was 
inevitable that a considerably large fleet of vessels was required, and then, 
it was not seldom that these laws became dead letters and had later to be 
revised. The law of 1382 (2nd Richard II. ch. 2.) offers the most striking 
instance of such cases. The law (1 st Elizabeth ch. 13.), issued in the first 
year of Elizabeth's throne, was one of the most glaring instances of the 
laws thus revised in later years. Thus, England gradually awakened to the 
necessity of dispensing with such form of general exclusion, and, instead, of 
resorting to a policy of partial exclusion, in which particular routes as well as 
specified cargoes would be reserved for national ships in a more moderate 
form. As an insstance of such partial restriction, there might be cited the 
series of laws/l which stipulated that the importation into England of the 
Gascogne wine should be loaded either by English or Gascogne ships. 
In the shipping acts promulgated by Cromwell and Charles II the 
policy of general exclusion of foreign ships did probably attain the biggest 
magnitude. Essentially these acts were for the purpose of the monopoliza-
tion of colonial routes. They, moreover, confined both the European routes 
(Importation) and English routes to the activities of English ships. Import 
into England by foreign ships of Asian and American goods as well as im-
portant European products was prohibited, and under the reign of Charles 
II, it was further stipulated that non-European goods were not to be im-
ported to England from European ports aboard foreign vessels. Seeing, 
further, that English coastal trade routes were likewise closed to foreign 
I) 4Znd Edward III. ch. 8, 136B; 1 st Henry VII. ch. 8, 1165; 4th Henry VII. ch. 10, 
1489-99; 32 nd Henry VIII. ch. 14. 1540. 
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ships, it would have meant, in those days, that virtually entire world sea 
areas had been monopolized by Englisch ships, to the utter exclusion of 
foreign vessels. For England then lacking an adequate supply of industrial 
and naval materials, the adoption of such a comprehensively prohibitive 
measure was probably unavoidable as part of her eager effOrCto build up 
her great fleet and expand her foreign trades. However, it should be recal-
led that these navigation acts were revised several times thereafter. It amply 
shows that literal enforcement of these acts was actually out of question. 
Such, generally, indicates what the general monolization of shipping routes 
is and how it operates. 
Similar measures of general exclusion were likewise taken by other 
countries. For instance, Sweden in 1724, France in 1793, and the United 
States of America in 1817 adopted similar steps. In 1825, however, Swe-
den slightly slackened the restriction and permitted an indirect trade with 
Norway. The example was quickly followed by other countries. In the 
case of the United States, the circumstance was a little different, for there 
such a measure was taken in retaliation against such country as had resor-
ted to a policy of excluding United States ships generally, and the other 
countries which had not excluded United States vessels were exempted from 
the application of the restrictive measure. France, on her part, could not 
afford to enforce such measure strictly to the letter under the impasse of 
the Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars. These countries, it is 
evident, apparently lacked the shipping bottoms in sufficient volume as would 
enable the literal enforcement of such exclusionist policy on the one hand, 
while, on the other, their respective national economies did not necessarily 
make such policy imperative. 
With the development of her capitalism toward the middle part of the 
nineteenth century, England became to be convinced of the fact that such 
'policy of monopolization of trade routes was rather tantamount to a sui-
cidal measure, and, following the successive major revisions effected in 1822 
and 1825, eventually took steps to repeal the navigation acts in the years 
1849 54. It should be noted that such was a natural transition attendant 
upon the metamorphosis of England from the second-type maritime country 
to the third-type. 
b) Monopolization of Colonial Shipping Routes. 
This applies to the case in which the navigation on the shipping routes 
connecting the homeland to her colonial territories is dominated by national 
ships. (The monopolization of the shipping routes from one port to another 
of a colonial territory would be considered in terms of the monopolization 
of the coastal shipping lines). 
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The navigation acts of Cromwell and Charles II originally were in-
tended for the monopolization of the two shipping routes, that is, the ge-
neral shipping routes and the colonial routes. To specify these in concrete 
terms: 
(I) The routes of import to England of Asian, African and American 
goods; 
(2) Routes of import to England of European goods; 
(3) Routes of import to England of non-European goods from Euro-
pean ports; 
The operation over these various routes was reserved to English vessels. 
It is noted that, referring to the above, item (1) is the case of the mono-
poly of the colonial routes, whereas items (2) and (3) refer to either general 
or specific monopoly of shipping routes. Among these, the most important 
was, of course, the case of item (1), while item (3) should rather be called 
a provision of guarantee for the purpose of safeguarding the monopoly as 
was provided for under item (1). The reasons why England had resorted 
to such legislative measures was, as has been repeatedly described, due to 
the fact that the Dutch merchant fleet, then dominating the entire world 
trade shipping, had the sea routes connecting English colonial territories vir-
tually under her rule and thus was in a position to hamper development of 
the English colonial policy, which was, in other words, that the Dutch were 
obstructing the development of English national economic or capitalistic 
foundation. In later years, England succeeded to get overhand over the 
Dutch, and, with the attainment of her immediate objective in view, Eng-
land had to repeal of the old policy of monopolizing her colonial routes. 
The first measure to come along this line was the permission enacted in 
1825 of the importing aboard foreign ships of colonial goods loaded at ports 
of origin, which was closely followed by another, when in 1849 the colonial 
routes were entirely opened to foreign bottoms. 
England was not the originator of the policy of the monopolization of 
the colonial shipping routes. As soon as she acquired overseas colonies, 
Spain strictly stipulated that Cadiz should be the port of leaving and arri-
val in traffic with her colonies in Africa, and Sevilla in traffic with her 
colonies in America. This provision was strictly observed. This was pro-
bably the most primitive form of the policy of the monopolization of the 
colonial shipping routes. In the case of Spain, such form of monopolization 
automatically died out with the speedy loss of her ovsrseas colonies. 
Even today France finds a certain degree of importance in the policy 
of the monopolizatio~ of the colonial routes. The origin of her policy dates 
back to the navigation act which J. B. Colbert promulgated in 1670 after 
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the pattern of the English. 
At present this particular policy, together with that of grantingsubsi-
dies, constitutes the main two measures supporting France's shipping policy. 
After the first World War, the then French Government boldly set upon 
the policy of the imperial preference or monopoly in regard to her colonial 
routes, and in the law of June 30, 1934, explicitly stipulated that "marine 
transportation homeward from colonial ports of colonial goods, excepting 
special cases, should be made by French merchant marine." In the law of 
June 28, 1935, no exceptional treatment was recognised in the transportation 
homeward of bananas, which was placed under a perfect French monopoly. 
A further advance in the same direction was, October 30, 1935, witnessed 
in the legislation, which made it obligatory to transport them by French 
ships!) 
One factor which led France to take such series of monopoly will be 
found in the internal nature of national economy in France, or, in other 
words, in the fact that her colonial policy generally lacks positiveness. In 
order to develop her national economy, France had to feed her existing 
merchant fleet on her monopolized trade routes, which were imperative for 
the maintenance of that fleet. The policy for the monopolization of her 
colonial and coastal routes was to meet this fundamental objective. Even-
tually distinction between these two categories was lost sight of. France, 
thus, went so far as to declare that the whole length of the shipping routes 
from Saigon to Marseilles was nothing but her own coastal route, and 
tried to reserve these whole routes for her national shipping. This tendency, 
however, it should be noted, is not confined to French policy alone; all the 
maritime countries of the first type more or less show such a tendency, and 
the United States of America would be cited as the most striking instance 
of this category. 
c) Monopolization of Coastal Shipping Routes 
Cromwell's navigation act would be called a challenge hurled by the 
English shipping (Type II) against the Dutch merchant fleet, which was 
then in a dominant position in the world sea trades. It would thus be seen 
that England at that time was under the urgent necessity to drive out the 
Dutch shipping not only from colonial trade lines but also from general 
European routes. In this particular case, further, it was imperative that 
the Dutch be expelled from the lines from one port to another in England, 
which bore the same meaning to the Dutch as the routes between foreign 
navigation ports. It was a matter of course that Cromwell's navigation 
1) Akar, M.: L'Evolution des Transports Maritimes en France depuis la Gnerre~ Paris 1937. 
Pl'. 171ff. 
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act kept this fully in view. 
In mediaeval England, there was a distinction of ships between larger 
ones and smaller ones. The latter were usually called "hoys" or "plates", 
which were strictly designated for domestic sailing and were not permitted 
to overseas trades. Evidently the aim of such stipulation was to avoid un-
necessary friction between these smaller coastal and larger ocean ships. This 
was, in other words, to mean that foreign trade was exclusively to be car-
ried by larger ships, and this, in turn, worked to promote the construction 
of larger-type vessels. Passing on to the Elizabethan dynasty, however, more 
drastic measures were taken: in 1562 a new act (5th Elizabeth, ch. 5.) 
was enforced aiming at reserving coastal trades to national ships to the ex-
clusion of all foreign vessels. The contention advanced in this connection 
was that no goods should .be carried from one port or creek of the Realm 
to another port or creek of the same Realm in any vessel whereof any 
stranger or strangers born are owners, shipmasters, or part owners. This 
should be considered to mark the very beginning of the policy for coastal 
trade monopoly. 
In the same way as it had been necessary, with regard to overseas 
trade, for England on the threshold of the modern ages, to expell Hanse-
atic merchants from her steelyards, so it was necessary, as she was about to 
be transformed into the second-type shipping country from the first type, to 
resort to such drastic measures. 
This policy for the monopolization of coastal lines, as has already been 
described in the preceding lines, was followed in the navigation acts of 
Cromwell and Charles II, and then, for the subsequent 200 years, this same 
line of policy has been faithfully followed by England. (While the monopoly 
of colonial routes has repeatedly been revised since its beginning, the moC 
nopoloy of coastal routes has been SUbjected to no revision during the 
period of these 200 years.) The example set by England was followed, 
successively, by Sweden (1726), France (1793), the United States of America 
(1817) and Prussia (1822), and thus the policy for the monoplization of 
coastal routes came to assume the appearance of being an inseparable and 
immutable section of the modern shipping policy. 
In 1854, five years after the repeal of the Navigation Acts, England 
took steps to repeal the policy of the monopolization of coastal routes for 
the same reasons which had prompted the earlier repeal of the Acts. This, 
however, was the result of a series of bitter controversies. (The repeal of 
Navigation Acts and the abolition of cabotage monopoly mean for England 
the development from the second type of shipping country to the third type.) 
American shipping was then a keen rival of English shipping in their competition for wo-
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rid hegemony. The English, therefore, had to consider carefully what effect would be brought 
to. bear upon American shipping in case her long-monopolized coastal routes were opened. W. 
E. Glandstone was against the repeal of the coastal routes monopoly. He contended that the 
entire route to San Francisco from Boston via Cape Horn, which the Americans would call 
just a coastal line, was by no means shorter to the line connecting the English homeland with 
Australia. Such highly oceanic routes would very well be comparable to the routes between 
English colonies widely stretched out. On the contrary, what is understood by the English 
as a coastal routes would be, for example, such as links Boston to New York, which is very 
much shorter in length. In view of this, he contended, the opening of the English coastal trades 
should be preceded by the understanding on the part of the Americans that the English pattern 
would be followed, or otherwise, these lines should never be opened. 
Re~orting against this, Sir Robert Peel asserted that any modification of the English stand 
in accordance with various different countries, such as America and the Netherlands, would 
only result in extending to no purpose the "existing situation which is described as highly 
complicated and half paralyzed," and argued for the outright repeal of the monopolization. The 
Manchester school including John Bright and Richard Cobden concurred with this, asserting 
that there would no longer be any need for English shipping to have domestic routes monopoli. 
zed for their sake, as it was actually engaged in a full.fledged activity over the overseas trade 
without political protection. 
While it stands to record that the free traders eventually scored a victory, the fact is 
interesting that five more years needed before the stipulation regarding the monopolization of 
coastal routes Was perfectly repealed after the salient provisions of the same legislature had already 
been virtually modified to null, as this would be interpreted as indicating the English conserva· 
tism which will come out to the fore when a drastic renovation is contemplated. 
As this was simply a measure taken with regard to English domestic 
coastwise routes, it naturally failed to affect the other countries so much as 
did the repeal of the salient points of the Navigation Acts. It was found, 
on the contrary, that most countries even then continued to reserve their 
cabotages to their own national ships, and England, on her part, never did 
mind this very much. England was then on the road of rapid capitalistic 
advancement and naturally her chief concern was centered on international 
overseas routes. Thus, according to Heckhoff, the coastal trades' became 
the object of the least concern toward the latter years of the nineteenth 
century.!) 
Preceding England, Holland opened her coastal trades to foreign ship-
ping. Norway, under the law of July 17, 1869, followed the suit of Eng-
land and opened her cabotage routes to foreigners. France, for once, fol-
lowed the English example and opened her colonial shipping routes, which 
she later closed for a second time, but, as regards her coastal routes, she has 
ever kept them under her monopoly since September 21, 1793. In the case 
of the United States of America, it should be recalled that that country, in 
keen competition with English shipping, had at first take steps to reserve 
its own domestic routes to her national ships. Her cabotage monopoly ought 
1) Heckhoff; S, 41, 
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to have opened following the change of policies on the part of England. 
This system, however, continued to remain in force even after that, and the 
reason for it was that America, since the end of the Civil Wars, was in a 
position to take drastic measures in order to forestall the decline of her ship-
ping .. GermanyO and Japan,') on their parts, were then in the face of the 
rising shipping and had to protect their respective national ships, and, thus, 
this system was ever strictly adhered to. 
Below follows a classification of various coastal trade systems followed 
by various countries :3) 
(i) Coastal lines closed to foreign shipping: 
France, Greece, Japan, Canada, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, 
the United States of America and others. 
(ii) Coastal lines opened to foreign shipping as a rule: 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden and others. 
(iii) Coastal lines opened to foreign shipping unconditionally and with-
out limitation: 
Belgium, England, Holland, Norway and others. 
This classification amply shows that those shipping countries belonging 
to the first and second type invariably have their coastal routes closed to 
foreign shipping, while those of the third type lave them opened. 
It is evident that the countries of the first type resort to this system in 
order, at least, to reserve their coastal routes to their own national fleet, 
while those of the second type are not in a position to open these routes 
unconditionally and without limitation to foreign shipping, because these 
routes, together with their overseas routes, constitute specific spheres of ac-
tivity for their national vessels. On the contrary, the third-type countries 
alone can safely open their coastal routes to foreign ships without any fear 
of such adversely affecting their own shipping. Their opening would rather 
be benefitial to themselves, because the spheres of activity for their own 
vessels would be widened further in the event of other countries following 
these suits and opening their coastal lines. This will be seen clearly in the 
maritime liberalism strongly advocated by England ever since the middle 
part of last century, especially after the end of the World War I. 
The English contention in this regard was: 
While there appears to be a view, regarding our coastal shipping, that this should he re-
served for our national ships, it would seem hard to concur with the fact, because not only the 
main activity of English shipping centers round overseas trade but also because foreign shipping 
entering and clearing English coastal ports constitutes merely less than I % of the entire vessels 
1) Law of May 22. lBBI. 
2) Ship Law of March 8. 1899. 
3) Heckhoff: SS. 36-8. 
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operating along the English coasts. As regards the Indian coastal trades, further, it seems rea-
sonable at first sight that this should be placed under exclusive English monopoly in consideration 
of the competition with Japanese shipping. But, this again is objectionable, because such would 
certainly be liable to incite Japan into competition in the other routes. The proposal for mo-
nopolizing, for the sake of English shipping, the shipping routes between English oversea territories 
and colonies would, again, appear without adequate foundation, because of the fact that no less 
than 90 % of transportation of goods there is dependent upon English tonnages. 
This is the gist of opinion advanced in the report entitled "Shipping 
and Shipbuilding Industries After the War" published by the Shipping and 
Shipbuilding Commission of the Board of Trade in 1918 in an effort to 
establish the shipping policy to be taken by England following the termina-
tion of the World War I. This view has ever since been firmly upheld by 
England as the guiding principle of her shipping policy, which, it should 
be noted, is a matter of course seeing that England is a third-type country 
as far as her shipping is concerned. 
The preceding lines have probably made it clear that the coastal ship-
ping policies adopted by various countries differ widely. This particular 
problem was taken up on the agenda at the World Port and Harbor Con-
vention convened in 1923, when no final conclusion was reached, probably 
because the definition of coastal trades varied uncompromisingly among the 
participating countries. It would be said, however, that the new mercanti-
lism, gaining power after the World War I, has generally tended to unduly 
widen the scope of the conception of coastal shipping. 
It would need to cite examples of many countries; let us here review 
the case of the United States, only. 
When in March, 1817, the United States took steps, by dint of Article 
4 of her Navigation Act, to reserve her coastal routes for only her own 
national ships, she had not a speck of territory of her own along the Paci-
fic. The subsequent aggrandisement of her territorial lands, however, gra-
dually made the United States extend the scope of the application of this 
Article: the first to be included in her coastal routes was the. route leading 
to Pacific portes from her Atlantic ports via Panama Canal. When Alaska 
also was included in her own territorial lands, American government aut-
horities defended their action with the contention these "territories belonging 
to the North American continent and being run under common ordinary 
political systems should have this stipulation applied likewise." However, 
the Congress of 1898-99 following the end of the American-Spanish War, 
discarded this view without much ado, and effected a surprisingly wider 
extention of the conception of coastal shipping to have both Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico embraced in the general framework. 
The provision for coastal shipping routes dated February 27, 1898, stipulated that "cargo 
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transportation from one American port to another, whether it is direct or via a foreign 'port, or ' 
whether it constitutes part of a navigation or other'wiseJ should always be done by United Sta~ 
tes ships." In 1914, the San Francisco port authorities filed a suit against a German vessel. 
which had reached San Francisco after .circling round the globe with New York as the starting 
point, on charge of violation of this particular stipulation. This extremity of absurdity did ac-
tually happen.') 
Ironically enough, such an unduly wide extension of the application of 
coastal shipping drove the American territorial islands into a highly disad-
vantageous position due to the fact that the United States then was not in 
possession of sufficient shipping bottoms to cover the entire shipping routes 
extending to these islands. Take the example of Puerto Rico. After the 
area was included in the American coastal routes system, the local export 
and import freight rates witnessed a rise; for instance, the freight rates for 
sugar from Puerto Rico to New York became higher than those from Cuba 
to New York. Not only this, but participation of many foreign vessels in 
the coastal trades of Puerto Rico would have resulted in an increase of 
foreign trades for that territory, if its trade had not been reserved exclusive-
ly to American shipping.') 
In spite of this fact, those shipping interests in America, in favor of 
subsidizing their shipping at that time, even advocated further extension of 
the application scope of the coastal shipping provisions. They voiced their 
opinion that this particular provision should be applied to the navigation 
between the American homeland and the Philippines. The treaty with Spain, 
however, offered various difficulties in the way of this being materialized. 
Another obstacles to this was the fact that the United States then did not 
possess enough bottoms to monopolize this extended routes. It was obvi-
ous that, if such were forcibly put into force, the consequence to be ex-
pected would have been precisely the same with that of Puerto Rico. The 
Congress of 1902 did show much hesitation and, indeed, eventually decided 
on the postponement of the enforcement of ths coastal shipping provision 
until July I, 1904, as far as the Philippine islands were concerned. During 
the intervening period, there was a bitter controversy between two opposing 
factions, one standing for the forcible enforcement of the provision in ques-
tion and the other attempting to have this particular routes exempted from 
its application and, eventually, in 1908, it was decided, from fear that the 
application of this provision to the Philippines would certainly result in a 
terrible rise of commodity prices there, that these islands were to be exclu-
ded from the application of the United States cabotage monopoly. 
This, however, failed to put an end to the movement for the extension 
1) Heckhofl": S. 40. 
2) Zeis, P. M.: American Shipping Policy, New York 1938. p. 56. 
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of the application scope of the American coastal shipping system. Reference 
should be made to the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, in this regard. This 
law, which is indicative of the preponderance of the American mercantilistic 
tendency prevailing at that time, decidedly laid down the principle that 
the coastal shipping provision could be applied to all American territorial 
lands and islands, with the additional stipulation, however, that the applica-
tion of the provision to such far-off areas as the Philippines would have to 
wait until a specific notification was issued by the President of the United 
States to the effect that the United States was in possession of sufficient 
shipping bottoms to carry the overseas trades with these islands. I t shows 
that the Philippine islands, which in 1908 were once exempted from its 
application, are now again included in the cabotage system. And then, 
the United States thought herself that she was equipped with a sufficient 
bottoms to efficiently monopolize the Philippine line, even though it was 
unrefutable that the available fleet were for the most part of wartime built 
and inferior quality. It may be added here that by dint of this law, Guam 
and Tutuila were also included under the American coastal shipping control. 
The New Deal, which was enforced in the midst of the world economic 
crisis, affected various fields of American national economy, and the ship-
ping industry was no exception. The effect of the New Deal on shipping 
was, however, not necessarily a welcome one, because, under the impasse 
brought by the drastic changes attendant upon it, the principle of free com-
petition and non-monopolization, which had been won by the Shipping Act 
of 1916, had to be thrown overboard. While the Shipping Act of 1916, 
(Article 18) on the principle of free competition, had granted on the go-
vernment authorities the right to determine the upper ceiling of freight rates, 
the attempts of the New Deal were now made, from the standpoint of restric-
ting competition or approving monopoly, to grant to the government officials 
the authority to determine the lowest limits of freight rates. This was in-
dicative of the general tendency, in the face of shipping depression conse-
quent upon the world crisis, for the protection of shipping liners prompted by 
the desire. to overcome this depression on the strength of liner companies, 
or, in other words, the shipping conferences. 
The same trend of policy was also seen in the cabotage system. In 
essense, the issue was that the general tendency was not for the monopoli-
zation of coastal lines, but, rather, for the strengthening of such policy. To 
explain this: 
No foreign vessel shall transport passengers between port or places in the United States or 
its possenssions, now or hereafter embraced within the coastwise laws, either directly or by way 
of a foreign port, or _ for any part of such transportation, nor on a continuous voyage termina-
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ting at the port of departure or at any other port in the United States or its aforesaid posses-
. sions, notwithstanding said vessel enters or toutches any foreign port on such voyage. 
The above quotation, constituting a part of the bill presented then by 
the Shipping Board, shows an attempt at the extention of the application 
of coastal shipping provisions to the extent that mere common sense would 
find it hard to comprehend. Fortunately, however, the proposal was critici-
zed by the then Secretary of State Stimson as being an "an artificial ex-
tension of the definition of coastwise trade beyond all precedent and beyond 
any previous application of the term m) and was not approved by Congress. 
While the American shipping policy has generally been accused of ha-
ving no definite principle to guide it, the protective policy with regard to 
her coastal navigation is its sole aspect which has steadfastly been adhered 
to. The influences swayed by the shipping lobbyists are well known; they, 
in a sense, had their interests centered on the intended monopolization of 
Amecican coastal lines. It cannot be denied that the American shipping 
policy has greatly been influenced by their maneuvers, explicit or implicit, 
and this fact should be taken as one of the characteristic featurs underlying 
the American shipping policy. America is so intended on securing the co-
astal trades monopolized by her own merchant marine. For her shipping 
has never been so powerful as to dominate overseas shipping and routes. She, 
therefore, always been prompted by the desire to keep her coastwise trades, 
at least, intact from a penetration by foreign fleet. In a word, it should 
be said that the United States, even today, remain to be a country belong 
. ing to the first type as far as her shipping is concerned. 
\ (2) Discriminating Treatment. 
While the monopolization of shipping routes as described avove should 
be interpreted as a manifestation of an imperial preference idea or such 
based on the flag discrimination, the same notion also took some other 
forms of expression as circumstances required. It, therefore, follows that 
our study should branch into multifold ramifications; here, however we will 
endeavour to confine our observations to as amall a spehere as possible, 
description being limited to pertinent salient points only. 
I) Discrininating Tonnage Duties. 
The discriminating tonnage duties and discriminatory customs duties 
constitute, perhaps, the methods of discrimination pregnant with the most 
important meaning besides the monopolization of shipping routes. 
Under the method of the discriminating tonnage duties, foreign ships 
entering a national port are clearly distinguished from national vessels, a cer-
1) Zeit: pp. 170-71. 
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tain fixed rate of duties being levied on their own tonnage. Though such 
a discrimination was first put into force at the time of Henry IV, France, 
nothing definite is known about when and how it was enforced and what 
effect it had then. Richelieu made an attempt at it, which is said to have 
been made into a law at the time of Mazarin, his successor, in 1659. 
In later years, the United States has most assiduously and positively 
followed this method of discrimination against foreign ships. In 1789, im-
mediately after her independence, the United States took steps to impose 
such discriminatory tonnage duties against all foreign vessels, irrespective of 
whether or not the foreign country in question had concluded a treaty of 
commerce and navigation with the United States. Although the circum-
stances and the implications of these tonnage duties imposed were rather 
complicated. It was stituplated that United States ships (those ships which 
had been constructed in the United States and totally owned by United 
States nationals or those foreign-built ships which had been continuously 
in possession of United States nationals since May 29, 1789) need pay only 
6 cents for every ton of their tonnage, while the rates of such duties were 
30 cents for those American-built ships whose ownership was partially or 
totally in the hands of foreigners, and as high as 50 cents for all other 
foreign ships, on every calling at a United States port. 
The" United States ships" as alluded here, it is noted, are in accordance 
with the definition provided for in the Ship Registry Law passed by Con-
gress in that year. It is reminded here that the discriminating tonnage 
duties were imposed quite separetely from the discriminating customs duties, 
which were imposed on the cargoes transported and imported aboard these 
foreign ships. The fact that such series of positive shipping policies as the 
Ship Registry Law, discriminating tonnage duties and discriminating custums 
duties was systematically adopted by the United States in those years, would 
call our attention and interest as indicative of the mercantilistic policy 
then in prevalence in that country. The adoption of discriminating tonnage 
duties, however, was more as a retaliatory measures aimed against England 
rather than a general policy. In the nineteenth century, and especially 
after the shipping policy of England became more of a liberalistic tendency 
following the termination of the Napoleonic Wars, the United States, in 
keeping with the changing tides, had gradually to revise her stand with 
regard to this policy. 
By virtue of the treaty concluded with England under the date of July 
3, 1815, the United States dsicriminating tonnage duties were placed on a 
reciprocal basis. The policy of discriminatory tonnage duties saw its heydays 
immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, with almost all shipping countries 
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besides England adopting it. Actually, however, these countries had a re-
course to reciprocal commercial treaties to lessen the effects of such discri-
minarory treatment, to the result that the discriminating tonnage duties 
system became nominal. The United States, in 1830, went so far, indeed, 
as to provide in a law that such tonnage duties would totally be abolished 
with regard to vessels of such foreign countries, which would afford similar 
treatment to United States ships. Impetus in the same direction was further 
given by the repeal in 1849 of the English Navigation Acts. Immediately 
following her suit, the comprehensive abolishment of the discriminating ton-
nage duties were carried out in such countries as Holland (1850) and Swe-
den (1857). 
It should be noted here, however, that the neo-mercantilism after the 
World War I wrought a reactionary effect upon this movement. For ex-
ample, the United States, in 1920, by virtue of Article 34 of its Merchant 
Marine Act, adopted a policy which made it feasible to adopt and enforce 
not only discriminating tonnage duties but also customs duties whenever 
such was deemed advisable. (Regarding this, the following item would be 
referred to.) 
b) Discriminating Customs Duties. 
The discriminating customs duties as referred to here allude to those 
customs duties, which differentiate between the cargoes carried by foreign 
ships and national ships, respectively, of which the former will be levied 
customs duties on a discriminatorily disadvantageous terms as compared with 
the latter. More specifically, such discriminating customs duties would more 
often be imposed on imported goods than on exported ones, and it more 
frequently occurs that those imported cargoes carried by third-party ships 
in an indirect import are more heavily levied than goods of direct import 
carried by foreign ships from their origin. 
According to Heckhoff,') it was after Henry VIII that such discrimina-
tory customs duties became to constitute the essential part of the measures 
against foreign vessels. We know, however, that, prior to this, Henry VI's 
Susidy Act of 1453 imposed a Foreigner's Duty on sundry woods carried 
by galleys or carracks. (In England at that time a carrack or galley usually 
meant a foreign ship.) A subsequent series of subsidy laws, thereafter, dis-
criminated against foreign ships. As instances of such would be cited the 
law of 1491 (7th Henry VII. ch. 7.) which levied such discriminating duties 
on imported Malmesey wine, the law of 1508 (10th Elizabeth, ch. 5.) which 
levied such on various imported fish, and another of 1597 (29 th Elizabeth, 
ch. 10.) which discriminated against imported salted fish. 
I) Heckhoff: S. 52. 
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Historically famous in this connection is the Maritime Law (1 st Eliza-
beth, ch. 13.) of Elizabeth I in the first year of her accession to the throne. 
As has already been described in the foregoing lines, this specific law served 
to replace the previous positive shipping policy aimed at the exclusion of 
foreign ships, with a system of discriminating customs duties. In a sense, 
it would seem to have been a retrogression of the previous positive policy; 
however, it should not be overlooked that such was enough to prove the 
elasticity of the series of policies adopted by Elizabeth I. 
One provision of the law stipulated that "export and import by foreign 
ships would be subjected to the payment of customs duties amounting to 
double that of such done by national ships." 
Perhaps the Subsidy Act of Charles II, 1660 (12 th Charles II. ch. 14.), 
would be cited as an instance of law containing the provisions for the most 
comprehensive discriminatory customs duties in the modern history of Eng-
land. Like the Navigation Act enforced in the same year, this Act was to 
encourage the shipbuilding industry of England by affording those special 
rights to the ships constructed in that country. There was stipulated that 
the "customs duties for sundry goods loaded at the place of origin and 
transported directly to England aboard such ships as were constructed in 
England would be made less than one-third of ordinary rates of such 
customs duties." Another provision said that "Foreigners should pay double 
customs on coal, if exported in foreign bottoms; but if in an English ships 
only fourteen shillings the chalder. Englishmen exporting coal in foreign-
built ships to pay aliens' duties." 
One of the most striking cases, thereafter, of such discriminating cus-
toms duties would perhaps be the United States immediately following her 
independence. The same session of Congress of 1789, which enacted the 
discriminating tonnage duties, as has been described in the preceding lines, 
had on July 4, just half a year before this, taken steps to establish discrimi-
nating customs duties, which provided for 10 percent reduction of customs 
duties for cargoes imported by American ships, while the law enforced under 
the date of August 10, 1790, stipulated that a 10 percent additional duties 
should be paid against cargoes imported by foreign ships. Spain in 1790, 
and France in 1816, also took similar measures of discrimination. 
It would perhaps be said that the development of legislative measures 
for such discriminatory customs duties has been broadly along the same lines 
as that of the discriminating tonnage duties. Let us now review the case 
of the United States. The United States reciprocal act of March 3, 1815, 
the Anglo-American reciprocal treaty of July 3, the same year, and the 
United States Shipping Act of March I, 1817, had a great deal in common 
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with that they all stipulated that ships of such foreign countries which have 
not taken discriminating measures against the United States would be ex-
empted from the application of general clauses. Further, on May 24, 1828, 
it was made known that the scope of such exemptions would be extended 
and ships of foreign countries taking similar steps against the United States 
vessels would be reciprocated by not being required to burden discriminating 
duties, irrespective whether these ships in question were engaged in direct 
trade or indirect one. It is needless to remind that such was the consequence 
of the great influence exerted by the English reciprocal act of 1823. It stands 
to record that other various countries were more or less affected by the gradual 
changes of shipping policy of England at the time. Thus, as a general 
tendency, the discriminating customs duties had become more lenient in terms 
or been abolished outright, either by the conclusion of new commercial pacts 
or by domestic legislative measures. Below is given a list of the countries, 
together with pertinent dates, which, besides the United States and England, 
took steps, then, to abolish their discriminating customs duties: 
August 8, 1850 The Netherlands 
February 1, 1851 Sweden 
February 2, 1852 Belgium 
November 22, 1868 Spain 
June 12, 1869 Austria 
December 22, 1870 Portugal 
September 13, 1873 France 
The discriminating duties policy is one method of shipping protection. 
Therefore, the fact that such discriminatory duties tended to be reciprocal 
in nature bespeaks the lessening of the requirements for shipping protection. 
The terminology of reciprocal discriminating duties is in itself highly 
contradictory; the more such tendency is generalized, the less meaning it 
comes to carry. In this sense, it would be said that the development 
of the principle of reciprocity in the first half of the nineteenth century was 
in a large measure affected by the transition of England, one of the fore-
most shipping countries of the world at the time, from the second type of 
a shipping country (on the principle of the basis of national economy, and 
flag discrimination) to the third type (on the principle of common carrier 
on the basis of international economy and non-f1agdiscrimination). 
It would be necessary, moreover, that consideration be given to this 
angle of question on a more genaral basis and from the point of view of 
the world history. Attention, in this connection, will have to be paid to 
the interpretation of Gregg, who asserted that the discriminatory customs, 
as a system, were, as far as overseas shipping was concerned, only prior 
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to the common carrier." 
When shipping in general followed the form of private carrier and 
goods required by a country were obliged to be transported on board its 
own shipping, all the countries, from the necessity of protecting and main-
taining national shipping in proper shape, had to adopt discriminatory 
duties, highly favorable to national ships and unfavorable to foreign ones. 
As, however, the form of common carrier gradually became to prevail, 
utilization of foreign ships proved not only easy but also sometimes more 
profitable, and it was found sometimes that discrimination against foreign 
ships was rather detrimental to national interests, or, to say the least, such 
discrimination ceased to be necessary.. It was because of this circumstance 
that discrimination in customs duties became more lenient in terms or was 
abolished outright after the latter half of the nineteenth century, wbile this 
is the reason why it has been asserted that the essence of the question at 
issue should be understood from the point of the world history. It should be 
emphasised here, in this. connection, this particular trend in general was 
never the consequence born of the modification of shipping policy on the 
part of one country, England. 
However, it should be reminded here with emphasis that the above sta-
tement is nothing more than a general tendency, the pattern of development 
being not identical with various countries. As the type of shipping itself 
differs with diffrent countries, the meaning carried by such discriminating 
duties differs with different countries. We will here review the subsequent 
developments witnessed in the United States. 
It has already been explained that it was soon after her independence 
in 1789, that the United States for the first time took legalistic steps regar-
ding discriminatory tonnage and customs duties. It has also been said that 
these steps, at the time, were for retaliation against England. Soon after 
the adoption of such discriminating provisions, the United States overseas 
fleet made a remarkable stride forward. The tonnage of her merchant 
marine in 1789 stood at mere 123,893 tons, which, after three years, rose 
to more than 400,000 tons; in 1794, 86% of export trades and 91% of im-
port trades were carried by her national ships.') In the light of these two 
facts-the establishment of discriminating duties system and the prosperity 
in her shipping industry-, the American people then tended to link them 
directly and to have the notion that her overseas shipping industry could 
attain such prosperity and development as a consequence of the introduc-
tion of discriminating customs duties. 
1) Gregg, E. S.: A Case against Discriminating Duties, Journal of Political Economy, Vol .. 30. 
Chicago 1922. p.405. 
2) Paine, R. D.: The Old Merchant Marine, New Haven 1919. pp. 96-8; Zeis: p. 4. 
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What, then, were the effects of the abolishment of the discriminatory 
duties? The merchant marine of the United States, which had shifted to 
reciprocity in 1815, saw a decrease by about 200,000 tons in 1818. This 
was naturally interpreted as the direct consequence of the adoption of re-
ciprocal provisions in the discriminating customs duties," 
It is evident, however, such interpretation, based upon an inadequate 
insight into the natural course of economic development, is wrong. The 
existence or otherwise of such discriminatory customs duties will never be 
responsible directly for either the rise or fall of the shipping industry. In 
general terms, it should be said, according to Zeis, that "the weight of 
historical evidence is all to the effect that the shipping prosperity before 
1860 was produced by causes other than discriminating duties,''') while, at 
the same time, the fact should not be lost sight of that the decrease of 
American shipping bottoms in 1818 merely represented a decline in the sta-
tistical figures consequent upon the revision of the regulations concerning 
the registered tonnage.') Especially, the fallacy of the conclusion that the 
adoption of reciprocal provisions would lead to the decline of American 
shipping will be amply proven by the fact that the American shipping 
industry has continuously sustained a general prosperity through years of 
reciprocal pacts adopted. 
The United States at the time of her independence was still largely 
unaware of the bountiful natural resources in her land and was a country 
imbued with a mercantilistic tendency, where shipping was considered to 
constitute one of her most important industries. It was, therefore, a matter 
of sheer necessity that her shipping be protected from the menace of fore-
ign (English) ships, by setting up highly discriminatory customs duties in 
favor of her national vessels. The United States was obliged to depend on 
her shipping for national prosperity and to adopt a system of discriminating 
duties for its protection. When American shipping seemed by itself to be 
able to go along the road to further prosperity, these discriminating duties 
were promptly abolished. Here again, criticisms hurled by Gregg were 
exceedingly sharp: 
"Not only is it impossible to prove that our shipping increased between 1789 and 1818 
because of our policy of discrimination, but it can be proved that a considerable increase took 
place immediately after the abandonment of this policy!' "To argue that discriminating duties 
in such a period were the causes of the expansion of our shipping is as logical as the statement 
that the La Follette Seaman's Bill made our shipping increase during the late war."!l.) 
I) Gregg: A Case against., pp. 408-09. 
2) Zeis: p. 59. 
3) Gregg: A Case against., p. 408. 
4) Gregg: A Case against., p. 405. 
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However, most people failed to take due cognizance of the immutable 
historical fact that, following the shift of the weight of American national 
economy to inland manufacturing industry from shipping, the latter had to 
gradually lose national attention and was allowed to decline, and, in the 
firm belief that the adoption of discriminating customs duties once served 
would bring a golden age to American shipping, its re-adoption was urged 
for American shipping. I) 
W. W. Bates was one of the most eager proponents of such proposal. 
He, a personification of discriminating customs duties, might well have re-
marked, after the fashion of a French King, "I am the very discriminating 
customs duties! "2) Thoroughly imbued with the notion, he never slackened 
in his effort to praise discriminating duties and urged for the adoption of 
them without delay. Many Congressmen of the Republican Party who 
deeply trusted Bates, eagerly endeavored to revive discriminatory duties in 
order to bring prosperity to American shipping once again. Senator Frye, 
one of these men, proposed that a clause for such discriminating duties be 
/ inserted to the 1894 Tariff Law, stipulating that 10% additional duty be 
levied on cargoes imported by foreign ships, while import of goods by fore-
ign vessels engaged in indirect trade should be banned unconditionally." 
His proposal, however, was not taken quite seriously. 
However, it was impossible for the Republican Party, which had stood 
steadfastly for a shipping protection, to give up the idea of discriminating 
duties. In 1896 the Party adopted in its policy platform the setting of such 
discriminations and the Republican President W. Mckinley declared that 
"the policy of discriminating duties in favor of our shipping which prevailed 
in the early years of our history should be again promptly adopted by 
Congress and vigourously is fully attained."') In the following year, Senator 
Elkins, in his effort to have the discriminating duties bill passed by Con-
gress, went so far as to urge the immediate and outright abrogation of all 
international treaties and pacts that might conflict with the provisions of ~ 
the bill. Although the move failed to gain popular support, it was none-' 
theless always the object of unwavering support in the circles concerned. 
At a public hearing in 1905 on shipping problems, predomidant views were 
advanced by such men as Charles Cramp and Edward Plummer who were 
in leading positions in American shipping and shipbuilding industries, that 
the policy of discriminating duties rather than that of granting subsidies, 
1) Culbertson, W. S.: International Economic Policies, New York 1925. pp. 430-31. 
2) Gregg: A Case against" p. 404. 
3) Zeis: p. 59. 
4) Zeis: p. 60. 
, 
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should be chosen for adoption. lJ 
However, the United States at the time had to take into consideration 
the fact that no less than 82 % of goods imported from South America, 
94% of those imported from Central America, 60% of those imported from 
China, 64% of those imported from Japan and 69% of those imported from 
India were non-duty articles. Should such discriminating duties were put 
into force in spite of these circumstances, all of these articles would have 
automatically to become the objects of discrimination, resulting in an exten-
sively deep adverse effect which would have meant prompt measures of re-
taliation on these foreign countries. Thus, the move for the revival of 
discriminating customs duties had ended in a failure in spite of ardent 
efforts exerted for the purpose for a number of years. To come at the last 
of the series of moves for reviving discriminating duties was the socalled 
Underwood Act of 1913, which, compared with previous bills intended for 
similar purposes, was much less drastic in its nature, stipulating only that 
a 5% reduction in the customs duties would be allowed for goods imported 
by American ships. Even this bill, however, hat to be shoved away under 
the Supreme Court, deciding that it would adversely interfere with the pro-
visions of pacts and treaties with various foreign countries concerned. 
Immediately following the termination of the World War I, American 
shipping literally threatened to surpass English shipping in its tonnages. 
People had again to revive their old memories. Spurred on by their con-
viction that good time had arrived for the realization of their long cherished 
desire, those, in support of the shipping protection policy, did everything in 
their power for the purpose, and at long last, they were met with success 
in legalising discriminating customs duties together with discriminating ton-
nage duties. Sec. 34 of the United States Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 
provides for: 
That in the judgement of Congress, articles or provisions in treaties or conventions to which 
the United States is a party, which restrict the right of the United States to impose discri~ 
minating customs duties on imports entering the United States in foreign vessels and in vessels 
of the United States, and which also restrict the right of the United States to impose dis.-
criminatory tonnage dues on foreign vessels and on vessels of the United States entering the 
United States should be terminated. 
This Article was so thorough in its stipulations prepared for actual en-
forcement that it further contained the following provision: 
The President is hereby authorized and directed within ninety days after this Act becomes 
law to give notice to the several Government respectively~ parties to such treaties or conventions, 
that so much thereof as imposes any such restriction on the United States will terminate on the 
expiration of such periods as may be required for the giving of such notice by the provisions of 
I) Zeis: p. 61. 
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such treaties or conventions. 
Actually, Congress moved promptly as the provIsIOns of this Act sti-
pulated, and urged the President of the United States to send the various 
interested countries the information of the intended abrogation of treaties 
and pacts concluded between these countries and the United States. Presi-
dent Wilson, however, in utter disregard of the desire of Congress thus ex-
pressed, refused to take steps to legalize such discriminating customs duties. 
The step taken by the President, however, was not a mere political 
one. The importance which American shipping industry occupies in the 
American national economy forced the President to decide on the taking 
of such a step, even against the desire of Congress. It was hardly necessary 
for the United States to resort to any fresh legislative measure for the 
national protection of her shipping. The United States is, in short, not 
the shipping country of third type. 
c) Oilier Discriminating Treatments. 
Besides the discriminating tonnage and customs duties, the discrimina- ( 
ting railway freight rates may perhaps be considered to be another method 
of discrimination against foreign ships. This is a method of discriminating 
unfavourably against foreign vessels in terms of railway freight rates to the 
port of export, the preferential reduction of rates being considered in case 
these goods be shipped aboard national ships. However, discrimination here 
does not necessarily call for a clear indication of the nationality of the 
vessels on which the goods be transported; a general reduction of domestic 
railway rates is often effected in an effort to have a national port chosen 
as the port of export. This method indirectly affects national ships favora-
bly and is usually resorted to when, as in the case of the European Con-
tinent, countries border closely to each other. 
Although the application of the method of special reduction of railway 
rates is never so generalized as the discriminating customs duties, such will 
be seen in force more or less extensively in such countries as Germany, the 
United States, France, Spain, Mexico and Russia. Especially wellknown, 
in this connection, is the method adopted by Germany prior to the W orId 
War I for export-goods destined to East Africa and the Levante region. 
Ships of the Deutsche-Ostafrika-Linie and the Deutsche-Levante-Linie were 
mainly operated for marine transportation to these areas. German railways, 
in making reduction of freight rates, did not specifically make it a condition 
for such that the goods destined to these areas be loaded on German ships, 
but such reduction, as actually made, served to indirectly induce them 
to be shipped aboard German vessels .. On this Heckhoff says that such was 
primarily for the purpose of encouraging German export trade but not for 
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subsidizing German shipping, pointing out that Turkish and Bulgarian ships 
as well as those of the Deutsche-Levante-Linie engaged in export trade to 
the Levante area and that these foreign ships were equally the beneficients 
of a preferential treatment by German railways in that the freight rates for 
the goods carried by them were also reducedY It is undeniable, however, 
that this method greatly helped German ships in increasing thcir utilization,') 
so that it prompted the Committee of Shipping and Shipbuilding set up 
by the British Board of Trade during the World War I, in formulating 
postwar English shipping policy, to take up the issue of the discriminatory 
railway rates employed by the Germans.') And, the conclusion reached by 
the Committee on this question was adopted at the Versailles Peace Con-
ference without any major revisions, which, eventually embodied in Articles 
323 and 325 of the Versailles Peace Treaty, forbade the Germans to employ 
such discriminating methods after September I, 1919. 
Ironically enough, however, this method-not an indirect one as was 
employed by Germany described above, but a direct one, in which discrimi-
nation was made according to the nationality of the ships used-was for-
mally legalised in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Article 28. To ex-
plain in explicit and concrete terms: this same Article, while forbidding 
generally the discrimination of railway rates by re-affirming Article 4 of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, 1887 (Iong-and-short haul clause), stipulates 
additionally that, in case ships which carry the specified passengers and 
goods were of American nationality, this provision shall not be applied. 
This is tantamount to an open recognition of discrimination in favor of 
national ships with regard to the reduction of railway rates. 
) It has already been repeatedly explained that the United States Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1920 was an embodiment of a mercantilistic shipping 
policy on the strength of the shipping bottoms suddenly built during the 
World War I. The provision for the discriminating railway rates was quite 
another manifestation of such trend. However, it was undeniable that the 
American shipping, although it was nearly equal to English counterpart in 
tonnage, was actually quite inefficient and inadequate to carry the entire 
export and import trades of America. Most of these American ships were 
of inferior quality constructed under the impasse of the war, and were 
naturally not entitled to fully engage in long-distance overseas transportation. 
Thus, it was found necessary, as a matter of fact, that this provision for the 
I) Heckhoff: S. 73. 
, 2) Dussol, A.: Les Grandes Compagnies de Navigation, Paris 1908; Jones, G. M. Government 
Aid to Merchant ·Shipping, Washington 1925. pp. 80ff. 
3) Board of Trade: Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries after the War, London 1918. 
28 S. SAWA 
discriminating railway rates carries an additional prOVISIOn inserted, to the 
effect that the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be empowered to 
prohibit the employment of such discrimination in case the U. S. Shipping 
Board formally testifies to the said Commission on the inadequacy of Ame-
rican shipping bottoms to be engaged in a specified overseas routes in" 
question. As record stands, moreover, these provisions for discriminating 
railway rates were actually invalidated when the Shipping Board made a 
public statement, right on the heels of the publication of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920, to the effect that the American shipping bottoms then 
available were quite inadequate to carry the entire American foreign trades. 
On February 27, 1924, however, the Shipping Board had a whim to 
declare in another statement that American shipping bottoms were suffici-
ently adequate to carry the entire American foreign trades. The consequence 
was that the Interstate Commerce Commission was obliged to have the pro-
visions for discriminating rates automatically invoked, and had to announce 
that the provisions in question would be considered valid after March 20, 
1924 (later changed, after June 20 of the same year). During several years 
interval between the first statement and the second, no radical changes were 
witnessed in American foreign trades, while it must be admitted that Ame-
rican shipping bottoms had during the same period actually decreased rat-
her than increased. Seen from this angle, a satisfactory explanation of the 
circumstances leading to the second statement, containg a radically different 
content as compared with the first, would seem quite hard to make. 
It was ironical that while exporters were generally supposed to benefit 
the most from the invokation of the provisions for the discriminating rail-
way rates, they were the very persons who most strongly maneuvered against 
them. The reason for this, probably, was that a small benefit resulting from 
such discrimination would be more than counter-balanced by the financial 
blow they had to expect to come upon their shoulders from the necessity 
of having their goods loaded on American vessels exclusively. In considera-
tion of such oppositions, the Shipping Board on May 8, mere two months 
after it had made a statement that American shipping bottoms were ade-
quate to carry the entire American foreign trades, had to revise it by 
confessing that, in spite of its previous statement, the Board was not quite 
sure of the capability of American shipping. Ever since then, this pro-
vision for discriminating railway rates has never been actually put into force 
in the U ni ted S ta tes. 
As other methods of discrimination against foreign ships, those of dis-
criminating canal passage charges, compulsory use of national ships by offi-
cials and passengers in general, discriminating treatment of water supply 
\ 
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and coaling services and immigrant control stations, etc. would, perhaps, 
be cited. No space, however, is now available here to discuss each of these 
various methods. 
My treatise "System of Shipping Theory" concludes with this number. The study about 
shipping finance or maritime credit as one of the methods of shipping policy, observed from 
the view point of "three types of shipping country," will be published in another chance. 
